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been adopted is capable of conveying a meaning detrimental to the
plaintiff. Newell on slander and libel, 4 th ed., 267. The fact that a
person's name is not mentioned in a publication alleged to be a libel on
him does not render it less libelous if the publication would be under-
stood as referring to him. Barron v. Smith, 19 S.D. 50 (1904). Some
persons might know the plaintiff by sight and not by name, or else
believe that he gave a fictitious name. Thus the defamatory article is
easily capable of conveying a meaning detrimental to the plaintiff.
The publication is libelous if it harms the party alluded to in the
estimation of an important and respectable part of the community, and
it is no excuse that the picture is published by mistake or in good faith.
Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 29 S. Ct. 154 (1908). Inno-
cence in a mistake, however, may mitigate damages. Van Wiginton v.
Pulitzer Pub. Co., 218 Fed. 795, 134 C.C.A. 483 (915). The
defendant also argued that under modern conditions, a publisher should
not be held to such strict accountability, because of the manner in which
news must be obtained and published. The court replied to this argu-
ment with the following quotation from Lord Mansfield: "Whatever
a man publishes, he publishes at his peril."
The principal case is in accord with the majority rule. Peck v.
Tribune Co., supra; De Sando v. New York Herald, supra; Wandt
v. Hearst's Chicago Zmerican, 129 Wis. 419 (19o6); Farley v.
Chronicle Pub. Co., 113 Mo. App. 216, 87 S.W. 565 (1905); James
v. Ft. Worth Telegram, I 17 S.W. 1028 (I9o9). It is believed that
this view reaches the better result. It conforms to the generally accepted
definitions of libel, and will compensate a person for injuries to his
reputation caused by an innocent mistake where the defendant has used
the greatest of care possible under the circumstances as well as for those
injuries caused by the defendant's negligence or malice.
GEORGE COLE.
EVIDENCE
BURDEN OF PROOF IN PROBATE AND CONTEST PROCEEDINGS
Corneal J. McWilliams, one day before his death, executed a cod-
icil wherein he revoked the prior appointment of the Central Trust Co.
of Cincinnati as executor-trustee of his will. Arthur J. O'Connell was
substituted in its place. The will was admitted to probate, but the codicil
was rejected. Upon appeal the judgment of the common pleas court
was affirmed upon the ground that McWilliams was not of sound mind
and memory and free from restraint and that the writing was not his
last will and testament. The court of appeals reversed the judgment
holding that: (i) a proceeding to probate a will is not adversary;
(2) when the proponents have made out a prima facie case establishing
the facts of Ohio G.C. Sec. 10504-22 admission to probate becomes
mandatory. McWilliams et al. v. The Central Trust Co. et al., 51
Ohio App. 246, 2oo N.E. 532, 2o Abs. 544, 5 Ohio Op. 104 (1935).
In considering the problems involved in the above case, it is perti-
nent to distinguish an action for the probate of a will from an action
for the contest of a will. The former is governed by G.C. 10504-22
and auxiliary statutes; the latter by G.C. 12072 to 12o87. Sec. 10504-
22 provides that "if it appears that such will was duly attested and
executed and that the testator, at the time of executing it, was of full
age, of sound mind and memory and not under restraint, the court shall
admit the will to probate." The section on appeal from probate, Ohio
G.C. Sec. 10504-30, states: "When the probate court decides not to
admit a will to probate a person thereby aggrieved may appeal from
this decision to the common pleas court . . .. "; and further Sec.
10504-31: " . . . . the court on hearing shall take testimony touch-
ing the execution of such will and have it reduced to writing . .. ."
Prior to the passing of the above statutes an action for the probate of a
will was not considered adversary but ex parte. If it were refused pro-
bate, no appeal was allowed but "another application may be made, and
probate established on new and better proof." In re Chapmnans will,
6 Ohio 149 (1833); accord, In re Hunter's will, 6 Ohio 500 (1834).
In discussing these decisions in the light of the application of the sub-
sequent statutes, Sec. 5934 (now 10504-3 o ) and Sec. 5935 (now
10504-3), supra, Justice Spear writes: "But the statute as to two
important particulars is essentially different now. Notice to executors,
the widow or husband, and next of kin of the testator is to be given
and any person aggrieved may appeal to the common pleas court by
filing an intention within ten days. These changes do not transform
proceeding into a strictly adversary one for no testimony can be given
against the will, but they do provide for bringing interested parties who
are permitted to cross examine witnesses and afford an opportunity to
appeal if any are aggrieved by an order refusing to admit the will to
probate and try the question again in the common pleas court." [Italics
writer's] "The court, by mandatory requirement of the statute, is called
upon to determine as to the existence of the right and it being ascer-
tained that the paper presented is the last will of the deceased, the ad-
mission of probate follows as a legal necessity." Missionary Society of
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M. E. Church v. Ely, 56 Ohio St. 405, 47 N.E. 537 (1897)- Accord:
In re Hathway, 4 Ohio St. 383 (1854); Fouke v. Fouke, 32 Ohio
App. 226, 167 N.E. 698 (1928); In re Jones, 2 Ohio Nisi Prius
194, 2 Ohio Dec. 404 (1895); Barr v. Closterman, 3 Ohio C.C. 441,
2 Ohio Cir. Dec. 251 (1888).
The rationalization of this position is based upon three grounds. The
first is found in the interpretation of the words of the statute as followed
by the principal case. Here the judge contends that the words "If it
appears" in G.C. 10504-22 and "the court shall take testimony touch-
ing the execution" in G.C. 10504-31 bear a restricted meaning, limiting
the proceeding in probate to an introduction of affirmative materials.
Added weight may be given to this interpretation in view of Sec. I 04 -
18 and a comment thereon in the Ohio Probate code, annotated, edited
by Frank M. Raymund: "The committee on revision presented an
amendment of this section intended to permit witnesses to be called by
opponents, but this was rejected by a sub-committee of the house judici-
ary committee 1935. So the hearing remains strictly ex parte."
The second ground upon which this conclusion is based is the
absurdity of having two will contests. In re Hathway, supra. The argu-
ment is that, if an adversary proceeding were permitted in the probate
court, there would be no need of having a will contest, since the contest
would have already taken place in the probate court. If such were
permitted there would be two methods of adjudicating the same fact,
"and the adjudication of the first tribunal, although not appealed from,
[would be] no bar to the second proceeding." It is unlikely that the
legislature would have provided for two modes of trial where one
would have been sufficient. In the contest proceedings "all the natural
facts in issue are to be heard and determined de noo as though order
of probate had not been made . . . ." Haynes v. Haynes, 33 Ohio St.
598, 31 Am. Rep. 579 (1878); Kammann v. Kammann, 6 Ohio
App. 455, 26 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 6o (1916). But in the statutory
"cappeal" from probate the case is taken up on error. Missionary Society
of M. E. Church v. Ely, supra; Hollrah v. Lasance, 63 Ohio St. 58,
57 N.E. 964 (19oo); Rothv. Seifert, 77 Ohio St. 417, 83 N.E. 61I
(19o8).
The third justification is founded upon the theory that the will has
no legal existence before probate and therefore is not subject to contest.
In re Hathway, supra; Sours v. Shuler, 42 Ohio App. 393, r8i N.E.
9o8, 12 Abs. io8 (1932); Petitt v. Morton, 28 Ohio App. 227, 162
N.E. 627 (1928).
The probate court, in considering the evidence introduced, is limited
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"to the inquiry as to whether the forms of law had been complied with
in the execution of the will, and the condition of mind and capacity of
the testatrix to make a disposition of her property as revealed by testi-
mony of the witnesses to the will." In re Mrs. Oskamp's will, 7 Ohio
Nisi Prius 665, 5 Ohio Dec. 584 (1898); accord: Mitchel v. Long,
9 Ohio Nisi Prius (N.S.) 113, 2o Ohio Dec. 41 (19o9). This is a
virtual limitation to the subject matter of Ohio G.C. Sec. 10504-22.
The burden of proof is placed upon "the proponent to establish
... .soundness of mind, freedom of restraint, undue influence and
observance of the formalities of the statute." In re Will Ludlow, 6 Ohio
Dec. (N.P.) 344, 4 Ohio Nisi Prius 155 (1897); accord: Mears v.
Mears, 15 Ohio St. 90 (1864); In re Son-Se-Gra's will, 78 Okl. 213,
189 Pac. 865 (1920); In re Ralph's estate, 192 Cal. 451, 221 Pac.
361 (1923). Such a conclusion would naturally follow from the fact
that the proponent is the only one permitted to introduce evidence. A
prima fade case is enough to sustain this burden. In re Hathway, supra;
In re Stacey, 7 Ohio Nisi Prius 277, 6 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 499 (1897);
In re Will Ludlow, supra.,
In ascertaining the nature of a prima facie case, in either probate
or other courts, two different interpretations have been used: one,
when the plaintiff has introduced enough evidence to get to the jury;
the other, when the plaintiff has made out a case so strong that he
would, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, be entitled to a
directed verdict in his favor. Under the first view the trier might find
in favor of the party having the prima facie case, but would not be com-
pelled to; under the latter view the party would be entitled to a directed
verdict in his favor. See 5 Wigmore, Evidence, (2nd ed.) Sec. 2494.
Both views are considered in the instant case, but even though there
is no jury, the court adopts the first: "If the matter is one to be sub-
mitted to the jury, and sufficient evidence is offered on all issues to
send the issues to the jury, we have a prima facie case, even though
there may be some parts of the testimony of the proponent's witnesses
which tend to negative one or more of the essentials established."
Whichever view the judge takes, it is mandatory on his part to admit
the will to probate when the prima facie case is shown. Missionary Soci-
ety of the M.E. Church v. Ely, supra; In re Will Ludlow, supra; In
re Stacey, supra.
According to the definition of the court in the instant case, strictly
speaking, a will may be admitted to probate where, if it had been tried
before a jury, there might have resulted a verdict either for or against
it. It is not certain to which rule the probate courts are to adhere in
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Ohio although there are some decisions which disagree with the principal
case. Gomien v. Eda Weidemer, 27 O.C.A. 177, 29 Ohio Cir. Dec. i
(917); Chaney v. Coulter, 29 O.C.A. 177, 35 Ohio Cir. Dec. 481
(Ic?8); dictum, West v. Lucas, io6 Ohio St. 255, 139 N.E. 859
(1922). It is certain that slight evidence is necessary to admit the will
to probate. In In re Stacey, supra, the court permitted probate where
the witnesses denied flatly the requirements of the statute. In re Stocker,
supra, probate was permitted upon the testimony of one witness, although
the other witnesses' testimony was to the contrary. Accord: In re
Watts, 19 Ohio Nisi Prius (N.S.) 225, 27 Ohio Dec. 87 (i916). The
judge in Stark v. Cress, 4 Ohio App. 92, 22 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) i88
(1914) went so far as to say that a witness who attaches his name to a
will implicitly certifies that the testator is of sound mind and competent
to make a will.
If the will is once admitted to probate, the only means of challeng-
ing its validity is by will contest proceedings provided by Ohio G.C. Sec.
12072 to Sec. 12o87, Mosier v. IHarmond, 29 Ohio St. 220 (1876);
Hollrah v. Lasance, 63 Ohio St. 58, 57 N.E. 964 (i9oo); Roth v.
Seibert, 77 Ohio St. 417, 83 N.E. 6i (19o8). The will contest,
however, is in the nature of an appeal from probate "where all the
material facts in issue are to be heard de novo as though such order of
probate had never been made." Kammann v. Kammann, 6 Ohio App.
455, 26 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 6o, 29 Ohio Cir. Dec. 349 (i916);
Taynes v. Haynes, 33 Ohio St. 598, 31 Am. Rep. 579 (1878); Dew
v. Reid, 52 Ohio St. 519, 4o N.E. 718 (1895).
Under the statute the proponent first produces the order of probate
and rests, then the contestant introduces his evidence, followed by the
proponent offering his other evidence, Ohio G.C. 12o85. The con-
testant must take the initiative and bring the case into the district court,
but the proponent introduces the first evidence. The proponent, al-
though the defendant, has the advantage of opening and dosing. In
this manner the procedure differs from the ordinary practice at law
where the party seeking action by the court and the party having the
burden of convincing the court or jury, has the advantage of opening
and dosing, Ohio G.C. 11447. Here the contestant has the burden
of convincing the jury. Kennedy v. Walcutt, ix8 Ohio St. 442, i6i
N.E. 336 (1928); Mears v. Mears, 15 Ohio St. 90 (1864); Behrens
v. Behrens, 47 Ohio St. 323, 25 N.E. 209 (189o).
The burden of convincing the jury should be distinguished from
the burden of going forward with the evidence. The latter is the
amount of evidence necessary to meet the prima facie case of the
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proponent and avoid a directed verdict in his favor, while the former is
the quantum of evidence necessary to sustain the whole issue, i.e., in a
will contest, the proof of the invalidity of the will. See Mears v. Mears,
supra. In Ohio it has been said that the ultimate burden is upon the
party having the affirmative. Klunk v. Hocking Val. R.R. Co.- 74 Ohio
St. 125, 77 N.E. 752 (i9o6); Lexington Fire, Life & Ins. Co. v.
Paver, 16 Ohio 324 (847); Industrial Commission v. Sutter, 7 Ohio
Abs. 37 (1929). In fact, the placing of this burden "is merely a question
of policy and fairness based upon experience in different situations," 4
Wigmore, Evidence, (2nd Ed.), Sec. 2486. A plausible argument in
favor of placing the burden upon the contestant is that ordinarily the
testator should be allowed to dispose of his property as he pleases, and
those who attack his will should bear the burden. A contrary policy
argument might be that since heirs usually inherit the property of their
ancestor, the side which seeks to sustain a disposition which cuts off the
heirs should bear the burden. Courts differ on the allocation of the
burden, Costigan, Cases on Wills, note page 224. Ohio, as has been
indicated, has placed it upon the contestant. The court in Mears v.
A Iears, supra, attributed this to Ohio G.C. Sec. 12083, "The necessary
effect of the provision is to change the burden of proof . . . . from the
propounders or contestees to the contestants of the will."
Early Ohio cases decided that the contestant must meet the prima
facie case of the order of probate and satisfy the jury by a proponder-
ance of all evidence that the will was not that of the testator. " ....
that the order of probate is prima facie evidence of due attestation, exe-
cution and validity of the will, and that to authorize a verdict that the
will is not the last will and testament of the deceased, the plaintiff must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence either the want of mental
capacity . . . ." Bloor v. Platt, 78 Ohio St. 46, 84 N.E. 604 (i9o8) ;
accord: Behrens v. Behrens, supra; Banning v. Banning, 12 Ohio St.
437 (i86i).
This burden was increased in Hall v. Hal/, 78 Ohio St. 415, 85
N.E. I 125 (i98). This case required that the evidence "adduced by
the contestant [must] outweigh both the evidence adduced by the de-
fendant and the presumption arising from the order of the probate."
The court reasoned that a presumption of validity was raised by the
statute. Sec. 12o83 which provides that, "On the trial of such issue,
the order of probate shall be prima facie evidence of due attestation,
execution and validity of the will." Since this decision, the Ohio courts
have followed the ruling without dissent. Van Demark v. Tompkins,
121 Ohio St. i29; 167 N.E. 370 (1929); Kennedy v. Walcutt, ii8
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Ohio St. 442, I6I N.E. 336 (1928); West v. Lucas, io6 Ohio St.
255, 139 N.E. 859 (1922); McFarland v. Clark, 8 Ohio App. 326,
28 O.C.A. 317 (1918); Kellner v. Hagood, 39 Ohio App. 351, 177
N.E. 637 (1930); Steinle v. Kester, 46 Ohio App. 245, 188 N.E.
395 (1932); Helmig, Exr. v. Kramer, 48 Ohio App. 71, 192 N.E.
388, i Ohio Op. 93 (1934).
In the Van Demark case, supra, the contestant vehemently protested
against the rule, claiming that by an application of such a doctrine he
would be deprived of the favorable testimony of the proponent's wit-
nesses, the benefit of cross examination, and the privilege of permitting
the jury to judge the demeanor of the proponent's witnesses. Judge
Day thought the objections of little consequence, since the contestant
was permitted to call the proponent's witnesses as well as to introduce
any evidence he desired to sustain his case, and pointed out that the rule
had been followed in the courts of Ohio "for over twenty years."
In analyzing the increased burden of the contestant in the terms of
the Hall case, it is necessary to inquire into the weight given the pre-
sumption. Judge Day, in the Van Demark case, supra, recommends
the following charge to the jury, " . . . the evidence tending to
invalidate the will must outweigh both the evidence tending to sustain
the will and the presumption rising from the order of the probate
court admitting the will to probate." This charge naturally raises the
question as to what is the true significance of the presumption.
"Legal presumptions are founded upon the experience and observa-
tions of distinguished jurists as to what is usually found to be the fact
resulting from any given circumstances and the result being thus ascer-
tained whenever such circumstances occur, they are prima facie evi-
dence of the fact presumed." Behrens v. Behrens, supra; McKesson v.
McKesson, 3 Ohio St. 156 (1853). Presumptions are divided into
three classes, "(I) conclusive presumptions, (2) disputable presump-
tions [presumptions of law], (3) presumptions of fact [inference]."
Beresford v. Stanley, 6 N.P. 38, 9 O.D. 134 (1898).
The presumption of validity is probably a presumption of law, al-
though in the light of Judge Wilkin's definitions of inference and
presumption in Ensel v. Lumber Ins. Co. of N. Y., 88 Ohio St. 269,
102 N.E. 955 (913), approved by Chief Justice Marshall in Glo-
wacki v. North Western Ohio R. R. Co., i16 O.S. 451, 157 N.E. 21
(1927) it might as easily be called an inference. However, assuming
that it is a presumption, what is its nature and what weight is it to be
given by the jury? Ohio courts are agreed that "facts presumed are
as effectively established as facts proved as long as the presumption
NOTES AND COMMENTS 299
remains unrebutted." The Lessee of Coombs v. Lane, 4 Ohio St. I 12
(1854). Iccord: Silvus v. State, 22 Ohio St. 90 (1871); Beresford
v. Stanley, 6 Ohio Nisi Pius 38, 9 Ohio Dec. N.P. 134 (1894);
Dalrymple v. Ohio, 5 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 185, 16 Cir. Dec. 562
(1904). However, as soon as evidence is introduced against the pre-
sumption, there is a sharp conflict among the courts as to its effect upon
the presumption. "According to some courts a legal presumption is to
be regarded as a piece of evidence to be weighed for the party for whom
it operates and to be overcome by evidence of the other party." IO
R.C.L. 871. Opposed to this view is that of Wigmore and others.
Under this theory a rebuttable presumption is a compelled inference.
It places upon the party the burden of going forward but does not alter
the ultimate burden of proof. No artificial probative weight is attached
to it and "when one offers evidence to the contrary (sufficient to satisfy
the judge's requirement of some evidence), the presumption disappears
as a rule of law and the case is in the jury's hands free from the pre-
sumption." See Wigmore, Evidence, (2nd Ed.), Sec. 2490, 2491.
Upon this proposition Ohio cases are not in accord. Views vary
from the statement that a presumption is evidence, Citizens Nat'l. Bank
v. C.N.O. & L.P. R.R. Co., 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 147, 11 Bull. 86
(1883) to a full compliance with Wigmore's doctrine. "In a civil action
the office of a presumption that one has obeyed the law is to cast the
burden of proving otherwise upon the party claiming that the law was
not obeyed; the presumption sustains the burden of evidence until con-
flicting facts on the point are shown and where evidence of facts is
introduced, the presumption is functus officio and drops out of sight;
Breman v. Puget Sound T. Co., 79 Wash. 137; Peters v. Lohr, 124
N.W. 853; Savage v. Rhode Island, 67 Ad. 633 and it is never error to
refuse to charge the presumption." Pletcher v. Bodle, 13 Abs. 708, 38
O.L.R. 482 (Ohio App., 1933). [Italics writer's]. Some Ohio cases
confuse a presumption with the conception of a prima facie case such as
in Klunk v. Hocking Valley R. R. Co., 74 Ohio St. 125, 77 N.E. 752
(i9o6), where the court considers Ohio G.C. 3365-21, " .. . .such
defect . . . . shall be prima facie evidence of negligence"; a statute
worded similarly to Ohio G.C. 12o85. The court says the effect of
the statute is to create a "prima facie presumption of negligence. Yet
the statute neither changes nor affects the rule as to the question or
degree of evidence to rebut or control the prima fade case so raised."
Likewise in Russell v. Russell, 6 Ohio C.C. 294, 3 Cir. Dec. 46o
(189i), a will contest proceeding, the court states that a presumption
makes a prima facie case and declares that the contestant's burden is
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sustained by a "bare preponderance." The nearest the Ohio Supreme
Court has come to adopting Wigmore's view is in the Glowacki case,
supra, in which Chief Justice Marshall quotes with approval from the
sections of Wigmore above- indicated. However, he was not adjudicating
a point" upon presumption, but upon inference. Although he approved
Wigmore's doctrine on inferences, it is not clear whether he adopted
his theory on presumptions.
However, if Wigmore's test is applied to Hall v. HallM, the court has
erred in giving artificial probative effect to the presumption and in
requiring that it be included in a charge to a jury. Such weight reason-
ably should not be given to the presumption.
The legislature in a recent statute, 113 Ohio Laws 123 (1929),
enacted into law the following: "But the effect of this presumption of
innocence is only to place upon the state the burden of proving him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Prior to the statute such a conclu-
sion was followed in Moorehead v. State of Ohio, 34 Ohio St. 212
(i 877), stating that it was no error to refuse to charge the presumption
of innocence. Since the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt is already upon the state, the presumption of inno-
cence adds nothing to it. In the will contest, the burden of proving the
invalidity of the will is on the contestant, in the same manner, the
presumption of probate, even a weaker presumption, should add nothing
to that burden.
Not only is the conclusion of the Hall case not in harmony with the
better accepted legal doctrine of presumptions but it places upon the
contestant both an undue and unreasonable burden of proof. In analyz-
ing the procedure for probate of a will from the time of its inception
until the will is admitted or rejected, these facts bear out the above
conclusion: (i) The prima facie case necessary for probate is achieved
when there is enough evidence introduced for the trier to find for or
against the will as is indicated in the principal case, (2) when the
prima facie case is established, the will must be admitted to probate
whether a verdict would be for or against it in the mind of the trier,
(3) the contestant has no opportunity to introduce evidence in the
probate court, (4) the admission to probate raises a prima facie case
of validity to which is added a presumption of validity, (5) The pre-
sumption is given artificial probative effect by the judge and in the
charge to the jury. In short, the weak prima facie case necessary in
the probate court, by the time it reaches the charge to the jury in the
contest, has been elevated by artificial rules of law, until the contestant
must not only produce enough evidence to outweigh it, but must also
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outweigh a presumption of due validity of probate, which he has not
had an opportunity to meet in the probate court.
LOWELL M. GOERLICH.
LABOR LAW
THE RIGHT TO PICKET IN THE ABSENCE OF A TRADE DISPUTE.
Three recent cases decided in the Court of Common Pleas of
Cuyahoga County involved the use of the injunction to restrain picket-
ing. In none of these cases was there a strike in process, nor was there
any legitimate trade dispute between the employer and his employees.
In the first case the labor union demanded that the employer raise
the prices charged for the dry cleaning of clothes, and that he stop
advertising low prices. Upon his refusal to comply, the union picketed
his place of business without using force or coercion. The Court en-
joined the picketing, finding that there was no legitimate trade dispute
and that the union's activities violated the Valentine Act. Markowitz v.
The Dry Cleaners Union et al., 19 Abs. 445, 3 Ohio Op. 366 (1935).
The remaining two cases involved a demand by the union for a
dosed shop. Upon the employer's refusal, his apartment houses were
picketed. The employer-employee relationship was entirely amicable.
The defendant unions, however, were engaged in using force in both
cases. The Court granted the injunction in these cases on the ground
of an illegal secondary boycott. Savoy Realty Co. v. McGee, 19 Abs.
682, 4 Ohio Op. 88 (i935) ; Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. McGee,
19 Abs. 691, 4 Ohio Op. 99 (i935).
The court in these last two cases intimates that had the picketing
been peaceful, without the use of force and coercion, and in furtherance
of a legitimate trade dispute, there would have been no ground for
injunction. In distinguishing between these cases and a California case,
Lisse et al. v. Local Union No. 31, Cooks, Waiters, & Waitresses, et al.,
2 Cal. (2d) 312 (935), 41 Pac. (2d) 314, in which both elements
were present, the court said each case must be judged upon its own
facts. "However we find no analogy . . . . In the California case we
find that the employees . . . . becoming dissatisfied, called a strike,
which was followed by picketing." The California Court granted the
injunction on the ground of undue force and coercion, but saying in the
course of its decision, "A trade union, besides having the right to call a
strike, has the legal right to carry on a boycott, both primary and
secondary."
